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Vulnerability, Resilience, and Responses: The European 
Elites System under a Prolonged Crisis 
Maurizio Cotta ∗ 
Abstract: »Angreifbarkeit, Resilienz und Reaktionen: Das europäische Elitensys-
tem in andauernder Krise«. The article discusses the consequences for the Euro-
pean political system, and more specifically for its elites, of the great recession 
of the years after 2008. After having defined the concept of European Elites 
System (EES) and specified its main components, the article analyses the differ-
ential impact of the crisis upon the different elite components. Special atten-
tion is paid to the difference between those European elite groups (domestic 
elites and members of the European Council and of the Council of the Europe-
an Union), which are directly or indirectly accountable to national electorates 
and the other elite groups (such as the components of the Commission and of 
the ECB) who are much more protected against popular protest and dissatisfac-
tion. This has produced a different degree of vulnerability and instability across 
these groups, but also important differences in the responses they have given 
to the problems arising from the crisis. These consequences are then analysed 
from the point of view of the democratic quality of the Union. 
Keywords: European elites, great recession, European Union, national politics, 
technocracy, vulnerability. 
1.  The EU and the Crisis Years 
What has happened to the political system of the EU, its political elites, gov-
ernance and representation processes during the troubled years of 2008-2017? 
The impact of these crisis years upon national politics has been thoroughly 
analysed and discussed (Bartels and Bermeo 2013; Dassoneville and Hooghe 
2015; Hernandez and Kriesi 2016). Increased electoral volatility, rise of new or 
non-mainstream parties, emergence of populist leaders, government crises, etc., 
have been the widely diffused consequences. They fit fairly well within our 
understanding of national representative systems: insufficient responses to new 
rising demands produce (softer or harder) adaptations on the supply side. The 
inertia of established elites opens the space for new elites (Pareto 1915).  
Yet, as most national political systems of Europe are today strongly embedded 
in the EU institutional framework, a simple analysis of domestic systems is not 
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enough to fully understand the impact of the crisis years. It is necessary to 
explore in more detail what has happened to the political system of the EU as a 
whole. Its system of governance and representation is clearly more complex than 
the national ones, yet equally relevant as it impinges significantly upon them. 
Given the important new powers gained since the Maastricht treaty and in 
more recent years by the central institutions of the EU, the European system of 
governance has been called repeatedly to act in response to the crises of the last 
years. The economic and financial crisis has challenged with special intensity 
the decision-making bodies of the EU, but the immigration crisis and, to a 
lesser extent, the security crises at the borders of Europe have also solicited the 
response of the Union. Although reactions to the crises have been judged in 
general slow to come and often not sufficiently bold (“too little too late” has 
been a frequent complaint), a significant array of measures have been adopted 
by the central institutions of the EU and through the joint action of the member 
states. The most important measures include the creation of two emergency 
funds (the EFSF, or European Financial Stability Facility, and the ESM, or 
European Stability Mechanism), the Six pack (a revision of the Stability and 
Growth Pact), the Fiscal compact (the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and 
Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union), the Quantitative Easing 
and other non-conventional actions by the European Central Bank, the so-called 
Juncker plan (European Fund for Strategic Investments) and the new flexibility 
in the application of the Growth and Stability Pact.  
Even without a detailed discussion of these measures, we can say that signif-
icant efforts were put in place through supranational and intergovernmental 
instruments to “restore fiscal order” and to fight the economic downturn in a 
serious recession period. We should also pay attention to the specific mix of 
measures adopted: it is easy to see that the main assistance measures for the 
countries in greater difficulties have been implemented through nationally 
coordinated instruments of solidarity (EFSF and ESM) or by a technocratic 
institution as the European Central Bank (ECB) (the LTROs and QE). The 
Commission, the most supranational institution of the EU, has not been able to 
go much beyond a largely defensive position to protect the “status quo” of the 
Union threatened by national efforts to cope with the crisis, or has adopted 
some very limited instruments of supranational solidarity. 
Each of the above mentioned measures, rather different in their nature and 
timing, has been inspired and guided, predominantly by a different institutional 
authority of the Union (the European Council, the Commission, the ECB) and 
(we can assume) reflects how the different components of the European Union 
political system were challenged by the crisis, and what were their strengths 
and weaknesses in developing a response. In a more systemic perspective, it 
seems plausible to suggest that the quality of the responses reflects the fact that 
the EU has only weak European-level mechanisms of political representation 
and its truly “supranational government” is by consequence seriously impaired 
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(Cotta 2018b). It is therefore not surprising that the strongest challenges were, 
pro tempore, faced via other conduits. These on the one hand reflect the con-
tinuing willingness of the European elites to save the Union and to resort to 
extraordinary means when a crisis endangers seriously its survival; but on the 
other hand also show a strong reluctance to endow the main supranational 
institution of the Union, the Commission, with more direct and powerful means 
of intervention. 
To go beyond these schematic answers it is necessary to understand in 
greater detail how things have worked politically in the Union during this period. 
I propose in this essay to check how the different components of the political 
system of the EU and in particular its ruling elites have been touched by the 
crisis. I will focus particularly on the economic and fiscal crisis as the immigra-
tion and security crises are still much more unresolved. 
2.  How and Where Was the Crisis Politically Felt? 
Since 2008 the prolonged economic and financial crisis has affected individual-
ly all the European countries, producing recession, unemployment, a rise in the 
poverty rates, crises and defaults in the banking sector, and pressure on sover-
eign debts. At the same time it has extended its negative effects upon the Euro-
pean Union as a whole, endangering the common market, putting under serious 
pressure the common currency and more generally threatening the cohesion of 
the Union. It is justified to rate it as the most serious crisis the Union has expe-
rienced since its creation. We must then try to understand what has been the 
political impact of all this for the politics of the European Union; more specifi-
cally how the crisis was felt by the political elites who rule the Union, and 
which were their answers. 
The political impact of economic downturns is not a new theme where na-
tional politics is concerned. The influence of economic factors upon voting 
behaviour has been thoroughly analysed, especially in the context of electoral 
studies (Lewis-Beck, Nadeau and Elias 2008; Bellucci and Lewis-Beck 2011). 
Overall, the hypothesis that economic bad times will negatively affect the in-
cumbent parties and leaders is broadly confirmed (Lewis-Beck and Nadeau 
2011; Kriesi 2012). This does not exclude however the mediating role of other 
variables such as the organisational strength of parties, the entrenchment of 
cleavages, the leadership factor, etc. The impact of economic factors at the 
macro level, upon the party system for example, has received less systematic 
attention and the findings are not yet conclusive (Tavits 2006, 2008). Recently 
attempts have been made to establish the effects of a major crisis such as the 
Great Recession both upon electoral behaviour and with regard to party system 
changes (Hernandez and Kriesi 2016). 
HSR 43 (2018) 4  │  36 
Quite understandably, given the predominantly state-centric perspective 
adopted in political science, the impact of economic and other crises has nor-
mally been discussed with regards to national political systems and their work-
ings (Talving 2017). In this paper the focus will rather be on that “compound” 
(Fabbrini 2007; Cotta 2012, 2014) or “multilevel” (Hooghe and Marks 2001) 
polity which is the EU. That such a perspective should deserve some attention 
is warranted by the fact that sixty years after its foundation the European Union 
is not just the pure sum of “N” member states but is a political system in its 
own right which significantly impacts the national systems (Hicks and Hoyland 
2011). This means that the dynamics of this system is on the one hand strongly 
influenced by the national dynamics of the member states (MS) (in this sense it 
can be said that the EU “stands on the shoulders” of the MSs) but on the other 
hand has its own specific “life,” which needs to be observed and understood. 
The point of view I propose to adopt here is that of political elites. The European 
Union – like any developed political system – depends on a group of people 
who concentrate a disproportionate amount of influence (Higley 2010). In 
order to explore how they have been affected by the turmoil of these crisis 
years, it is first necessary to briefly discuss the structure of the European Union 
elite. As we will see it displays some very peculiar features, but also others that 
are not totally different from those of national systems, especially if they have a 
federal structure. Its study may prove important for the development of a more 
complete theory of political elites as it may help to understand better an in-
creasingly relevant grey area of politics between international and national 
dimension (Cotta 2018). 
Given the highly peculiar institutional structure of the European polity, its 
political elite also has a particularly complex configuration. In fact, rather than 
talking of a European elite we should discuss a system of elites made of a plu-
rality of components: I will call this the European Elites System (EES). Which 
are its most relevant components? The first component of the EES is the com-
posite set of the member states’ national elites (28 today, 27 after the imple-
mentation of Brexit), which play not only a national role but also a European 
one as their national preferences (and decisions) set the stage for the process 
that will lead to European decisions (Moravcsik 2013). This component is also 
directly responsible for the “production” of the second component of the EES: 
the members of the European Council and of the Council of the European 
Union (formerly the Council of Ministers). As the two institutions are com-
posed of the incumbent members of national governments – heads of govern-
ments or heads of states in the European Council, ministers in the Council – the 
members of this elite component have what we might call a hybrid nature. 
They play, at the same time, high level and very demanding national roles and 
equally important European ones. A similar position is held by the Governors 
of the national banks, who are part of the Governing Council of the ECB, while 
maintaining their position at home. The important feature of this elite compo-
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nent is that the European institutional role of its members lasts only as long as 
their national institutional positions are maintained. When they lose their na-
tional job they lose also the European one. The third component consists of 
those who work exclusively in the central institutions of the Union: political 
members and high bureaucrats of the European Commission, members of the 
European Parliament, members of the Executive Board of the ECB, and judges 
of the European Court of Justice. The members of this elite component have 
undoubtedly important national roots and linkages, as their recruitment into the 
supranational institutions is significantly connected to their national identity. 
However, their institutional affiliation is limited to one of the European institu-
tions. While they are serving in Europe they do not maintain a national institu-
tional position. Their bases of legitimacy are different: they have a democratic 
nature in some cases, a technocratic one (resting on specialized expertise) in 
others. 
Because of its composite nature, the state of the EES and, presumably, also 
its reactions are bound to be affected by a plurality of influences. In order to 
study the impact of the crisis the different components must be treated sepa-
rately as their life depends from different institutional mechanisms. Only in a 
second step can one discuss the systemic outcomes of these changes.  
The starting assumption is that a crisis of significant severity such as the cri-
sis (or crises) of this period should have challenged the incumbent elites and 
increased their vulnerability. The support and legitimacy they had enjoyed in 
normal times may prove insufficient in hard times. The second assumption is 
that, given the different nature of the components of the EES, this impact will 
presumably be asymmetric. The vulnerability (i.e. the probability of elite mem-
bers losing their position in the institutional circle of power) should be highest 
where the linkage with public opinion is more direct and lower when it is less 
direct. This does not mean however that the authority of technocratic elites 
would not be challenged, but in more indirect ways compared to democratic 
elites.  
3. National Level Effects 
In view of the fact that the most effective democratic mechanisms of reaction 
(via representation and accountability) to the problems and demands of the 
population(s) of the European Union are still national, we must start from the 
nation-level effects and then move to European indirect and direct effects. To 
assess the vulnerability of national political elites I will concentrate my attention 
on the consequences of elections upon national parliaments and cabinets and 
compare the crisis period (2008-2016) with the pre-crisis period (1995-2007). 
With regard to parliamentary and governmental elites, the first indicator I 
will use is a volatility index and check to what extent it has changed over time. 
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The second indicator is the cabinet incumbency effect, which is the electoral 
losses or gains sustained by the incumbent government parties at each election. 
I will then analyse prime ministerial vulnerability, i.e. the frequency of changes 
in prime minister after an election.  
The volatility index (or Pedersen index) is currently used to evaluate the de-
gree of stability and institutionalisation of party systems and electorates. The 
expectation is that in a crisis period voters should be more inclined to defect 
(especially from governing or more in general from established parties) and to 
transfer their preferences to opposition and new parties. The total volatility is 
thus expected to increase. 
Table 1: Electoral Volatility in Parliamentary Elections (Pre-2004 EU Members) 
Country 1995-2007 2008-2016 Absolute Increase 
Increase 
(%) 
Austria 11.1 17.0 5.9 53.0 
Belgium 11.3 12.8 1.5 13.5 
Denmark 9.9 15.2 4.3 53.2 
Finland 10.0 11.5 1.5 14.7 
France 20.0 23.6 3.6 17.8 
Germany 8.1 15.2 7.1 87.9 
Greece 6.2 24.4 18.3 296.9 
Ireland 8.9 27.2 18.4 207.3 
Italy 13.6 24.0 10.4 75.9 
Netherlands 21.2 19.7 -1.5 -7.2 
Portugal 11.4 11.1 -0.2 -2.0 
Spain 8.5 12.1 3.7 43.2 
Sweden 15.7 9.8 -5.9 -37.7 
UK 8.1 12.7 4.7 57.7 
Average volatility 11.7 16.9 5.2 44.2 
Source: Emanuele (2015), updated by the author. Cyprus, Luxemburg, and Malta not included. 
 
If we analyse first the member states before the 2004 enlargement the results 
indicate an increased volatility in 11 of the 14 countries considered (Table 1). 
Greece and Ireland with volatility tripling from the first to the second period 
are the two most striking cases, followed by Germany and Italy, then by the 
UK, Austria, Denmark, and Spain. Sweden and to a lesser extent the Nether-
lands and Portugal, show on the contrary a decreased volatility.  
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Table 2: Electoral Volatility in Parliamentary Elections (CEE Countries) 
Country 1995-2007 2008-2016 Absolute increase 
Percentage 
increase (%) 
Bulgaria 42.9 34.5 -8.4 -19.5 
Croatia 27.5 24.7 -2.8 -10.2 
Czech Republic 20.7 38.3 17.6 85.2 
Estonia 48.5 17.6 -30.9 -63.7 
Hungary 20.5 21.5 1.0 2.0 
Latvia 57.4 48.1 -9.3 -16.2 
Lithuania 57.3 47.5 -9.8 -17.0 
Poland 46.3 23.2 -23.2 -50.0 
Romania 29.2 32.5 3.3 11.5 
Slovakia 59.2 29.6 -29.6 -50.0 
Slovenia 25.5 42.6 17.1 66.9 
Average volatility 39.5 32.9 -6.7 -16.9 
Source: Author’s calculations. 
 
The results for the 11 CEE countries show an opposite trend: in seven of these 
countries the volatility decreased (in some cases very significantly) (Table 2). 
Only in four countries (and especially in two) there were increases. This suggests 
that the crisis had no substantial effect on these political systems. However, one 
has to remember that the first period under analysis is still very close to the 
initial phase of democratic transition and the difficult process of creating and 
consolidating a competitive party system. It is therefore not so surprising that 
high volatility rates characterized that period. The lower levels of volatility in 
the subsequent period (but still much higher than their Western counterparts) 
suggest to use these data with great prudence. The quantitative analysis con-
ducted with measures of electoral volatility could be improved by more qualita-
tive instruments, such as by exploring to what extent the increased volatility is 
due to the rise of new parties or of parties that are critical of the establishment 
and/or of Europe, instead of shifts between established parties (Powell and 
Tucker 2014). 
If we limit our analysis to the first group of countries, we see that while vol-
atility has increased more or less everywhere during the second period, the 
relationship between increase in volatility and depth of the crisis is not equally 
strong. Just to mention a few cases, among the countries most heavily hit by the 
crisis, Portugal shows low levels of volatility. On the other side Germany, one 
of the countries which fared best in the crisis, has seen a rather significant 
increase in volatility. This implies that the effect of the crisis is probably medi-
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ated by other variables, which may reduce or increase its impact. The different 
degree of resilience of the party system is probably one of these, but also the 
configuration of parties supporting the governments in office during the crisis 
may have played a role (some interesting ideas on this point are offered by 
Roberts and Wibbels 1999).  
If increases in volatility signal a greater readiness of voters to shift alle-
giances, the next step is to ask to what extent this means also a greater readi-
ness to “punish” governments, presumably for their inability to solve the prob-
lems caused by the crisis or crises or at least to mitigate their effects. To 
investigate this aspect I have used two different indicators: the electoral losses 
of parties represented in government (Parties in Government Electoral Losses 
or PiGEL); and change in the person of the prime minister (PMChange) after 
an election. 
The data collected for all 28 EU countries show in a large majority of cases 
for the PiGEL indicator the negative impact of this period on the electoral 
performance of parties in government (Table 3). In 21 out of 28 cases the par-
ties in government have on average suffered more during the second period 
than during the first one. And the average losses of governing parties in all 
countries have nearly doubled between the first and the second period. However, 
it is interesting to notice that in seven of the eleven CEE members of the EU 
the losses of the parties in government were in the second period smaller than 
in the first one. This result, which might appear surprising, is probably to be 
explained again by the fact that in the new democracies the first period in-
volved the difficult problems of the transition and a lengthy process of institu-
tionalisation of a competitive party system: these two factors probably affected 
negatively the performance of parties in government. Among the “old Europe” 
states, three of the countries most heavily hit by the economic crisis – Greece, 
Ireland and Spain – have seen the greatest average losses of the governing 
parties. It is an open question why the impact has been much lower in Italy and 
Portugal, which have been also deeply affected by the crisis.  
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Table 3: Two Indicators of Cabinet Vulnerability 
Country 
PiGEL1 PiGEL PMChange2 PMChange 
1995-2007 
% 
2008-2016 
% 
1995-2007 
N 
2008-2016 
N 
Austria 2.7 8.6 3/4 1/2 
Belgium 0.4 2.2 2/4 2/2 
Bulgaria 26.5 12.3 3/3 3/3 
Czech Republic 1.5 21.5 3/4 2/2 
Croatia 9.5 12.6 3/4 2/2 
Denmark 2.1 4.3 1/4 2/2 
Estonia 1.0 -1.2 3/4 0/2 
Finland 3.9 7.7 2/4 2/2 
France -1.6 12.6 1/3 0/1 
Germany 3.8 7.3 2/3 0/2 
Greece 2.5 21.7 1/4 4/4 
Hungary 6.7 17.8 2/3 1/2 
Ireland 1.8 26.5 1/3 1/2 
Italy3 0.0 4.3 3/3 2/2 
Latvia 8.4 6.9 3/4 0/3 
Lithuania 16.4 9.8 2/3 2/2 
Netherlands 9.3 12.6 1/4 1/2 
Poland 19.0 10.6 4/4 1/2 
Portugal 8.9 9.6 3/4 2/3 
Romania 10.0 8.4 3/3 2/2 
Slovakia 14.5 12.7 2/3 2/3 
Slovenia 11.0 19.2 1/3 3/3 
Spain4 0.6 16.1 2/3 1/2 
Sweden 3.4 4.2 1/3 1/2 
UK 6.4 10.2 1/3 1/2 
Average 6.7 11.1 61% 68% 
Average Euro-
zone5  12.4   
Non Eurozone  9.8   
 
With regard to the second indicator – the change of prime minister between the 
cabinet preceding the elections and the one following them (PMChange) – the 
                                                             
1  PiGEL (Electoral loss of parties in government): a positive percentage indicates an average 
electoral loss; a negative percentage indicates an average gain. 
2  PMChange: the numbers indicate the proportion of new prime ministers over all the gov- 
ernments formed after an election. 
3  In the Italian case I have counted as “governing parties” also the parties which gave parlia-
mentary support to the Monti technical government. 
4  The elections of 2016 were not counted, since the cabinet in charge before the elections 
was a caretaker government. 
5  In the calculation of the Eurozone average I have included only the countries (in bold) 
which were from the beginning of the period part of it (thus Slovenia is included, while Es-
tonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia, which joined later, are excluded).  
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table indicates that in more than 60% of the cases the incumbent prime minis-
ters did not survive the election. In this case also the average has (moderately) 
increased between the first and the second period.  
The first indicators used to assess the vulnerability of national elites of the 
EU during this period have consistently shown a negative change between the 
first and the second period under examination. The volatility of electorates has 
increased almost everywhere, the governing parties and prime ministers have 
also faced greater difficulties in defending their positions. We can easily imagine 
that national political elites have read these data as a sign that voters had grown 
more unhappy because of the crisis, and that to maintain their support in face of 
increasing challenges the policies proposed had to be more in tune with this 
dissatisfaction. 
In the political system of the EU, what happens at the national level has 
direct bearing on the European institutions as well, so we may turn now to the 
European level effects. 
4.  The European Level Effects 
Given the institutional structure of the European Union, the first and until now 
the main channel through which what happens in society and shifts in the mood 
of European citizens can be “represented” at the European level is through the 
political impact in Brussels of national level effects. As already mentioned, two 
crucial European institutions, the European Council and the Council of Minis-
ters, due to their indirect composition will necessarily be affected by all the 
changes taking place in national governments as the result of national elections. 
In order to assess how much these bodies are affected we can look at the 
changing composition of their membership due to the political events in the 
member states.  
I will focus my attention on the European Council as this institution is the 
top decision-making instance of the Union. To assess the impact of the crisis 
years I have computed an Index of European Council turnover (ECT). As the 
number of members of the Council has changed over time due to accessions of 
new countries, the index is calculated as the annual proportion of new EC 
members over the total number of members6 (Figure 1). Between 1996 and 
2008 the average ECT was of 16.3%, and from 2009 to 2017 it increased to 
                                                             
6  As in the year of accession of a new country its member of the Council is necessarily new, I 
have included new countries from the second year of participation. For example the mem-
ber of the European Council for Austria (which entered in the EU in 1995) was counted only 
in 1996. The first period ends with 2008 as the impact of the crisis could be felt only in the 
following year. 
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24.8%. This turnover rate meant that in the second period the membership of 
the European Council was renewed by nearly a half every two years.  
Figure 1: Percentage of Newcomers in the European Council (Annual Average) 
(1996-2008 and 2009-2017) 
 
Turnover rates are to some extent depressed by the presence of presidents 
(Cyprus, France, Lithuania, and Romania) who typically have a fixed term of 
tenure. However in three of these cases (France, Lithuania, and Romania), a 
stable president may be accompanied by changing governments, which may 
have some consequences for the policy making process of the European Council. 
To further detail this picture we may measure the persistence of the EC 
members and their tenure. How many long-term members are there? In 2017 
only 28.6% of the EC members had at least four years of tenure (Merkel being 
by far the most experienced, with 11 years in this body), while 25% of the 
members were newcomers. The average tenure was approximately 2.5 years.  
While the personal composition of the European Council is intrinsically un-
stable because of its institutional format, its political composition has not 
changed very much so far. If we consider the party affiliation of prime minis-
ters and presidents and the linkage of their national party to the European Par-
liament parliamentary groups, we find a persistent dominance of the three 
mainstream groups (S&D, EPP, and ALDE). Only since 2015 have two repre-
sentatives of non-mainstream parties entered for the first time the European 
Council: on the left the Greek Prime Minister Tsipras of Syriza (belonging to 
the GUE/NGL group in the EP), and on the right the Polish Prime Minister 
Szydlo of PiS (affiliated to ECR European Conservatives and Reformists 
Group in the EP). 
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Thus if the European Council (and the same can be largely extended to the 
Council of the European Union) is by its nature an institution with a constantly 
changing membership, the increased vulnerability of national elites and nation-
al governments in crisis times has made for a more rapid circulation of its 
membership. It is reasonable to assume that this increased instability of the 
highest political body of the Union has reduced its ability to decide promptly 
and to take bold measures when faced with crisis situations.  
What has happened to other components of the EES during this period? I 
will consider here only the European Commission and the European Central 
Bank, two central bodies of the Union. The European Court of Justice has 
played a less crucial role during this period and can thus be omitted from this 
analysis. In the political and media debate the first two institutions are often 
negatively qualified as non-democratic bodies. In fact they are quite different in 
their composition and political nature. The Commission, while often criticised 
by national politicians as being technocratic, has in reality predominantly polit-
ical features. Nominated by the European Council on the basis of candidates 
proposed by national governments, the Commission needs the approval of the 
European Parliament, that is to say of the representative assembly of the Union. 
Its formation process has in fact become today not different from that of na-
tional governments in parliamentary systems. Its peculiarity is that each of its 
members, the “ministers” of the EU, must be allocated to a different member 
state. This institutional rule very significantly reduces the flexibility of its polit-
ical composition: its members typically reflect the political make-up of the 
governments of the member states. The commission is thus dependent on two 
principles: on the one hand, the member states maintain the right to choose 
“their” commissioner, and typically do this on the basis of the political orienta-
tion of their governmental majority; on the other hand there is the EP majority, 
without whose approval the Commission cannot take office. The political na-
ture of the Commission is also apparent from the point of view of the profes-
sional and political background of its members. With very few exceptions, its 
members are present or former top politicians of their country (Döring 2007). 
All recent presidents have been former prime ministers in their country, and 
they have been joined as commissioners by other prime ministers, ministers for 
foreign affairs, economics, or finance and, not unexpectedly, ministers of Eu-
ropean affairs. This shows that the Commission has a high status in the ambi-
tion rankings of European professional politicians. This is not surprising since 
it ensures a high level of visibility, coupled with stability (one or maybe two 
five-year terms) and much higher salaries than a comparable position in a na-
tional government.  
How was this body affected by the crisis? From the political point of view, 
continuity has prevailed: throughout this period the Commission has reflected 
the absolute dominance of the three mainstream political groups: the People’s 
Party, Liberals, and Socialists. Only one commissioner (an independent) in the 
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First Barroso Commission and one in the Juncker Commission (a British Con-
servative) did not belong to one of these three political families. In the last 
three Commissions, the European People’s Party has always held the largest 
number of seats and controlled the position of president.  
If we compare the European Council and the Commission, the second is 
clearly more stable than the first. Of the members of the European Council who 
were in office at the beginning of 2015, when the Juncker Commission was 
appointed, only 17 out of 28 (or 60%) were still in office at the beginning of 
2017. And during the period of the second Barroso Commission only 10 out of 
27 (or 37%) members of the European Council who were in office at the be-
ginning of 2010 were still in place at the end of 2014. In contrast, members of 
the Commission rarely resign or are dismissed. 
Thus, if we observe the two main political bodies of the Union – the Euro-
pean Council and the Commission – we have two contrasting images. We see 
the increased vulnerability of the Council under the impact of national elections 
and their consequences for the composition of national governments, and at the 
same time a high degree of stability and political continuity of the Commission. 
The political continuity in the Commission is linked to the grand-coalitional 
nature of the Union executive, which dampens the effects of national electoral 
volatility, and to the lack of an opposition able so far to challenge the domi-
nance of the three mainstream parties dominating the European Parliament. 
Even if the 2014 European elections saw an unprecedented increase of Euro-
critical parties, this surge has not translated into a different majority in the 
Commission (Treib 2014). This suggests a situation where one component of 
the EES – the members of the Council – must be more attentive to the electoral 
moods, while the other – the Commission – has much less to fear and is more 
insulated from political events. 
We can now consider the third most important component of the EES, the 
members of the executive board of the European Central Bank. The top gov-
erning body of the ECB, whose independence is enshrined in European treaties 
(Art. 282 TEU and Art. 130 TFEU), and which, unlike the Commission, is not 
based in its composition on the one country-one member principle, is much 
more isolated from member states and current political influences. The very 
strong professional qualifications required for its members (three of the current 
members are former governors of national central banks, the other three had 
high level positions either in the central banks, or in ministerial positions), and 
the fact that their appointment has to be approved by a qualified majority of the 
European Council, further contribute to the authority of this group. Yet even 
this elite component has not been immune from the special challenges and 
pressures of this period. This is suggested by the two successive resignations of 
the German member of the ECB Council (Axel Stark in 2011, then Joerg As-
mussen in 2013). To this should be added that the legitimacy of some of its 
decisions was more than once challenged by politicians of various countries 
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and also submitted to judicial review by some national Constitutional Courts 
and finally assessed by the European Court of Justice. Overall, however, the 
central decision-making body of the ECB has to be considered as a stable and 
durable component of the EES, bringing a strong technocratic component to it 
but not devoid of a remarkably acute policy vision. 
5. The European Elite System and Its Reactions to the 
Crisis 
The evidence discussed in this article can help to understand a bit better how 
the EES has fared in a very critical period. As could be expected, given the 
complex institutional structure of the Union and of its ruling authorities, the 
impact of the crisis was not homogeneously felt across the different compo-
nents of the EES. The brunt of the crisis years, the problems they generated, 
and the resulting dissatisfaction that spread among European publics, has been 
most clearly borne by the components of the EES who are more effectively 
connected to the opinion of the voters through highly competitive elections 
able to produce significant degrees of accountability. Other components could 
remain more insulated from citizens’ protest and anger. Since national elections 
are still the most efficient channel of citizens’ participation, national political 
elites and their European projections have been more strongly affected by the 
crisis. The increased vulnerability of national elites has projected its effects 
upon the “intergovernmental” components of the EES: in particular it has re-
sulted in increased turnover rates and diminished continuity in the membership 
of the European Council.  
The Commission, the other institution indirectly connected to the mecha-
nisms of electoral representation via the election of the European Parliament, 
has been “protected” to a much greater extent from the impact of the crisis by 
the political-institutional format of its mechanisms of formation and accounta-
bility. In spite of the 2014 innovative designation by the European parties of 
candidates for the position of President of the Commission (the so-called 
Spitzenkandidaten), the persistent weakness of European elections as a European-
wide channel of representation/accountability (Schmitt 2005; Hix and Marsh 
2011) has failed to transmit a strong mandate for action to the Commission. 
Moreover, the “one member state-one commissioner” rule and the grand-
coalitional arrangement between the large established parties have contributed 
to diluting the political profile of this institution. In the European parliament, 
however, the Commission has had to face a more vigorous opposition from the 
new Eurosceptic parties. 
The third most important component of the EES, the governing board of the 
ECB, has obviously been little affected by electoral connections; but the selec-
tion of its chief and of new members, when substitutions have been due, has 
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required the support of national governments through the European Council. 
The effects of the crisis have made themselves felt to this component of the 
EES from the “functional” side, when the developments of the financial crisis 
have threatened the “domain” itself of the ECB, by endangering the perma-
nence of one or more countries within the Eurozone and eventually the survival 
itself of the common currency. The demands to act innovatively have therefore 
become more compelling. 
We can now look at the actions taken by the components of the EES exam-
ined so far and try to elucidate how they fit with the picture we have presented. 
The synthesis provided by Table 4 illuminates sufficiently well the complex 
reactions of the EES to the crisis. It emerges rather clearly that the “political” 
government of the Union, embodied in the institutions of the European Council 
and the Commission, has shown little ability or willingness to put in place 
Europe-wide policy instruments able to cope in a structural and active mode 
with the downturn of the economies of the EU and its most serious conse-
quences, such as slow growth, increased unemployment, reduced investments, 
and rise of poverty. On the one hand, its actions have been of a defensive na-
ture, oriented towards protecting through regulatory means (both European and 
intergovernmental) the EU “building” from the disruptive effects of the critical 
situations developing within member states’ economies. On the other hand 
(mainly at the initiative of the European Council) it has promoted the creation 
of special instruments (the EFSF and ESM) based on resources individually 
provided by all the states (and not by the EU as such) to address the most critical 
national situations with emergency loans. Only a rather small truly European 
instrument, the so-called “Juncker plan” (EFSI: European Fund for Strategic 
Investments), was launched in the final stages of the crisis. This has meant that, 
to a large extent, national governments have been left to face the consequences 
of the crisis within the constraints of a European regulatory framework more 
focused on the defence of the status quo than on the promotion of economic 
development. 
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This response mix fits quite well with the political situation of these two 
components of the EES. It has been quite “natural” for the members of the 
European Council, under the strong pressure of national accountability in a 
crisis period, to look to their domestic political market and at national interests, 
and to think only subordinately in terms of a common European interest. The 
fear of Euro-critic challengers has suggested to most national leaders a strong 
reluctance to advance or accept bold European solutions, which might have 
been attacked at home as a betrayal of national interests. Only when the possi-
ble default of one of the member states could endanger not only that country 
but also the interests of the other countries (for instance their banks involved in 
financing sovereign debts) did they become willing to accept the introduction 
of extraordinary instruments (but kept under intergovernmental control). As for 
the Commission, the weakness of the accountability pressures generated by the 
European electoral process, and the lack of a European political mandate, has 
encouraged this institution to fall back on its more solidly established functional 
legitimacy, that of “guardian of the treaties,” and to essentially work through its 
regulatory arm (strengthened with the regulations and directives of the 2011 
“Six Pack” adapting the Stability and Growth Pact) (Bauer and Becker 2014). 
This has been only marginally corrected by the adoption of somewhat greater 
flexibility in the application of the rules (in exchange for the implementation of 
the so-called “structural reforms” by national governments) and by the launch-
ing at the end of 2014 of a limited investment promotion plan. 
In a somewhat paradoxical way the most straightforward formulation of a 
common European interest and the most powerful means put in place to defend 
it have come from the least “democratically representative” component of the 
EES, the leadership of the ECB. Faced with the increasing financial fragmenta-
tion of the Eurozone, highlighted by the seriously augmented differences in 
interest rates across the Euro countries particularly during 2010-2012 (European 
Parliament 2016), and even more by the realistic risk of the breakdown of the 
monetary union, the ECB has managed to substantially enhance its role 
(Schmidt 2016) and to develop new powerful instruments of action. To “save 
itself” as the institution in charge of the Monetary Union, the ECB had to “save 
the euro.” To achieve this goal its leadership became convinced that it had to 
resort to non-conventional measures when interest rates adjustments were not 
enough. That this choice met with strong resistance was evidenced by the res-
ignation of the German member of the ECB Board in autumn 20117 and by the 
criticisms that were recurrently raised in the media and by politicians in Ger-
many and other Nordic countries. The choices of the ECB were also legally 
                                                             
7  Another sign of the resistance to the new policies of the ECB was the resignation in Febru-
ary 2010 of the head of the Bundesbank and thus de jure member of the ECB Governing 
Council. 
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challenged more than once.8 It is probably to strengthen its position that the 
ECB leadership supported the introduction of the Fiscal Compact (Draghi 
2011), proposed by the European Council, as a balancing measure to reassure 
the “virtuous” countries of the Eurozone, while the ECB was ready to launch 
more aggressive policies to solve the Euro crisis and protect the financially 
endangered countries.  
Overall the picture which emerges is that of a rather complex mix of policies 
adopted by European authorities. Some were more defensive, others more 
proactive, some of an extraordinary nature, others of a more ordinary one. 
Some were slow in producing results, others more rapid. Some were rather 
prudent, others more bold. The mix is not too surprising when we consider the 
complexity of the EES and the different political pressures and inputs under 
which its components have been operating during the crisis years.  
In a perhaps oversimplified, but fundamentally true, view it could be said 
that the European Council (and behind its back the democratically legitimated 
national elites) and the technocratic body of the ECB held the central stages of 
the crisis response. The Commission was in a way “squeezed” between these 
two powerful actors. Its action was not irrelevant but lacked in comparison the 
clout given to the first by its national democratic base, and to the second by its 
functional autonomy and the potential availability of substantial resources 
(when the question of their legitimacy was solved by the impending crisis of 
the Euro). 
While the combined actions of the European Council and ECB, buying 
time and providing support for the recovery of the European economy, have 
contributed to avoiding the most disastrous consequences of the crisis, the 
weakness of a common Europe-wide process of representation and accountabil-
ity and of a more direct connection between European decision-making au-
thorities and the European citizens has reduced the ability of the EES to more 
effectively “imagine” (Anderson 1990) Europe as a true Union and to articulate 
its common interests. It has also made for a rather limited development of 
ordinary and structural means to face future crises. The high reliance upon the 
technocratic institution of the ECB to face the crisis has further confirmed the 
underdevelopment of the democratic channels in the Union.  
Looking ahead, we can say that the internal imbalances of the Union and of 
its ruling elites have not diminished at the end of this period. The decisional 
centre of gravity has been maintained (to an even increased extent) in the “in-
tergovernmental institutions,” who are precisely those most negatively affected 
by the crisis and the least able to produce efficient decisions. This has produced 
                                                             
8  Following a complaint the Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) programme of the ECB 
was referred by the German Bundesverfassungsgericht to the European Court of Justice; the 
legitimacy of the ECB action was confirmed by the ECJ with its ruling of June 16, 2015 
(Judgment in Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and Others). 
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a deficit of decisions firmly anchored to a European democratic process. On the 
other side, there are complaints about the role of technocratic institutions as 
“non-democratic,” but these institutions are de facto pushed to substitute for 
the more democratic institutions if these are not able to decide. Some of the 
problems highlighted many years ago by Fritz Scharpf in his comparison of the 
EU with federal systems have not yet found a satisfactory answer (1988). 
Should we be surprised if this situation fuels a high level of general dissatisfac-
tion with the EU? 
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